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Abstract
The recent spectacular progress in assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs) has resulted in new ethical dilemmas. Though 
women occupy a central role in the reproductive process, within 
the ART paradigm, the importance accorded to the embryo 
commonly surpasses that given to the mother. This commentary 
questions the increasing tendency to position the embryonic 
subject in an antagonistic relation with the mother. I examine how 
the mother’s reproductive autonomy is compromised in relation 
to that of her embryo and argue in favour of doing away with the 
subject-object dyad between them, particularly in the contexts 
of surrogacy and abortion. I also engage with the Surrogacy 
(Regulation) Bill, 2016. A critical discussion of the privacy 
judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India helps examine 
how personal autonomy of the body and mind extends to include 
the reproductive autonomy of women as well.  
Introduction
“Putravati Bhava” – may you be blessed with progeny – is 
traditionally an extremely coveted blessing for a woman. 
progeny is highly prized for most and childlessness appears 
to be a curse for couples. The essence of female autonomy, 
particularly in male-dominated societies, lies in women’s ability 
to control their own fertility, and reproductive autonomy 
provides women with a model for personal autonomy. 
however, the different reproductive technologies that abound 
in the contemporary world tend to scale women down to 
secondary positions, or even, at times erase them. The question 
may arise as to whether the increasing subjectification of the 
embryo reduces women to the position of an antagonist. In the 
first part of this commentary I examine whether the alleged 
“primacy” of the embryo has in any way contributed to the 
marginalisation/erasure of women. 
while discussing the subject-object dichotomy between 
the embryo and the mother, the commentary moves from 
the concept of motherhood to a theorisation of maternal 
subjectivity. It does not deny the potential of childbearing as a 
meaningful activity but denies that childbearing is a necessary 
part of women’s nature. There are many women who are not 
able-bodied and lack the capacity to get pregnant and give 
birth naturally. If motherhood is viewed as synonymous with 
womanhood, would women who are infertile, homosexual, 
or not able to get pregnant naturally, not be considered 
women? They are women as well, though in a developing 
context such as India, infertility is commonly viewed as some 
sort of disability (1: p 117). The situation of infertile women in 
India is aggravated by their being negatively limited in their 
social and political participation (1: pp 113,117-119). Infertility 
may result from delayed pregnancy, sexually transmitted 
infections, or abortions conducted in unhygienic conditions 
(2: p 165). Advancements in medical science have made it 
possible for clinics providing assisted reproductive services, ie, 
the ART clinics, to promote their services as offering a chance 
to negotiate infertility. India has more than 1000 in-vitro 
fertilisation (IvF) clinics offering a range of services including 
surrogacy (3). Despite the debates and the recommended 
ban on commercial gestational surrogacy, the demand for 
surrogacy has scarcely waned; and yet sections of society 
continue to consider it a taboo (4). This commentary examines 
how reproductive autonomy and privacy get compromised 
for women in India; it critically reflects on the abortion and 
surrogacy debates, especially in the light of the recent verdict 
on privacy passed by the supreme Court of India on August 24, 
2017.
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The mother and her embryo: a subject-object dyad 
new reproductive technologies are rarely controlled by 
those who seek them. women are urged to believe that their 
lives would be incomplete if they do not have children. such 
a framework reduces mothers to objects. The mother as a 
woman, an agent in her own right, remains largely absent in 
such discourses; further, the subjective meaning a woman 
gives to the lived experience of mothering a child gets 
overshadowed. within the praxis imagined by the ARTs, women 
are increasingly objectified. ARTs involve privately contracting 
a biogenetically curated pregnancy using IvF. The aspect of a 
woman’s choice is sidelined. women have to undergo painful 
hormonal stimulation; the egg retrieval process involves risk to 
women’s health. The rights and safety of women are now more 
at stake. with ARTs they are reduced to commodified means 
to solve the infertility problem. This tendency to objectify 
women gets aggravated when we accord higher value to the 
embryo as a subject at the cost of objectifying the gestating 
woman. This leads to the woman being represented as an 
interchangeable object rather than a unique subject. 
Does default maternal subjectivity lie in the process and act 
of a woman becoming a mother? One may say that mothers 
are subjects in the sense that they have experience – of 
gestating, giving birth, breastfeeding, mothering, where each 
experience is both unique and also dovetails into another, 
overdetermining each other. but to be a subject one must 
not only have experience or live through experience, but 
also one must author the meaning of that experience and 
be able to exercise autonomy in the process, regenerate new 
meanings that are adapted to one’s own situation and history. 
Others would argue that motherhood connotes a natural 
state or condition which functions as an empty category 
into which the needs of the embryo, ie, the future child, 
can be placed. while talking of maternal subjectivity, stone 
points out that, mothers are often not properly recognised 
as subjects by others around them. Indeed, mothers often 
experience the transition to motherhood in terms of just this 
loss of recognition (5: p 2). with pregnancy a woman, who has 
been formerly viewed as an agent of her own life and been 
treated by others as a centre of agency, is suddenly perceived 
as largely subservient to the embryo she is nurturing. Thus, 
with pregnancy, women begin to lose control of their lives; 
they feel that in entering the realm of the maternal body they 
have fallen into a formless realm that excludes meaning and 
autonomy. mothers do strive to regain subjectivity where it 
has been compromised, but this cannot be the usual kind of 
subjectivity grounded on separation from the maternal body. It 
can only be subjectivity of a new kind, arising from their place 
in maternal body relations. 
In fact, institutionalised “regard” for human embryos has been 
captured in various forms in laws around the world, adversely 
impacting gestating mothers. Ethical policies have been 
motivated by a belief in the innate sanctity or value of the life 
of human embryos which extend to prevent the destruction of 
the embryo through a range of measures (6: p 71). These laws 
completely override women’s decision making. The choices 
of women – whether to use the embryo (especially when 
pre-implanted) for one’s own pregnancy, or donate it for the 
reproductive use of another woman, or freeze it for future 
use, or donate it for research purposes, or destroy it – are not 
prioritised within such a framework. when we accord a moral 
status to the pre-implanted human embryo, there is an overall 
acceptance that it is an entity of social and ethical significance 
from conception onwards and its inception into human life. 
This idea implies that embryos are of abstract significance 
to society at large, rather than of specific importance to the 
woman undertaking infertility treatment. The importance of 
the embryo is concentrated in its potential for life rather than 
its representation of the myriad potentialities and desires to 
the mother herself (both in potentiality and actuality). There is 
a general tendency to represent women as wombs and child 
bearing operators, instead of composite persons (7: p 240). 
Feminist theorists began to query the romanticised version of 
self-effacing motherhood (8). The painful maternal experiences 
of ambivalence have remained under-explored. During 
pregnancy, a woman contains at least two beings within 
her body; however, women are absorbed by a sense of the 
“otherness” besides her own self existing in the maternal body. 
whether interpreted as mystical “communion” or nightmarish 
exploitation, the reciprocal exchange through the placenta 
which transfers nutrients in one direction and waste-products 
in the other, continues as a physiologically intimate and 
integral process. with advancing pregnancy, the uncontrollable 
nature of the “other” occupying the maternal body becomes 
increasingly evident. Far from an idyllic “communion”, 
pregnancy is often accompanied by a sense of invasion from 
a parasite sapping the resources of the host body (8: p 9). It 
becomes an ethical imperative to shift the subjectivity from 
the “embryo” to the “mother”. Karpin suggests that a feminist 
regulatory response might be initiated by challenging the 
primacy of the disembodied embryo – disembodied because 
the embryo hovers between having a materiality in terms of 
mass and weight, and a simultaneous lack of personhood. 
Indeed, it would challenge both its physical detachment 
from the female body and its social detachment from the 
parental relation. The next step would be the replacement 
of the “phantasmic preominitional [sic] embryo with an 
alternate phantasm: that of the not yet pregnant pregnant 
woman." within the ambit of the feminist regulatory 
response, the “not yet pregnant” pregnant woman would be 
accorded legislative visibility and centrality, not the embryo 
(9: p 621). millbank proposes a relational sense of the embryo 
that centres the woman and values the “intensely personal 
and infinitely variable” meaning to her. This framework of 
relational sense of the embryo centering the woman not only 
allows us to consider a woman’s decision making concerning 
her embryo as part of a broader political and social context, 
but also accepts that this experience incorporates an 
individualised, fluid and variable sense of kinship and 
belonging, in which the embryo may but not necessarily be 
regarded as part (6: pp 85-86). 
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Technological advancements in the sphere of health, especially 
women’s health, have come to (re)shape conventional scripts 
of sexuality, pregnancy, childbirth and parenting. but these 
advancements have not led to the recognition of women’s 
choice and agency. In India, having a genetic child is of 
fundamental importance in upholding the validity of the 
institution of the family. Thus, ARTs began to play a vital role 
in addressing such concerns, in order to preserve caste and 
community as they enable people across the board to have 
genetically related children. ARTs provide technological 
solutions to produce a child that bears the genetic imprint 
of oneself. not having one’s own genetic child is a social 
impediment, for genes are one of the ways families are made 
(10: p 2). Families are assumed to be an essential social unit and 
support for people. Families preserve and perpetuate caste 
and community through maintaining the genetic lineage of 
heterosexual couples (11). Commissioning couples availing 
of an IvF service may express a preference for a surrogate 
belonging to a particular caste or religious community 
(12: p 6). Thus, ARTs have a big role in the preservation of 
caste and community. Infertile married Indian women are 
stigmatised by the socio-cultural normative framework of 
society. For these women then, resorting to ARTs in order to 
realise their desire for motherhood becomes the only viable 
option to “cure” their infertility. but there is need for more 
research and dialogue on ethical issues related to women’s 
health and bodies with regard to invasive ARTs and surrogacy. 
The following sections address how the question of women’s 
autonomy was debated in the issues on abortion and 
surrogacy in India. 
ARTs in India 
The Indian Council of medical Research (ICmR) developed 
research guidelines for the development of testing reproductive 
technologies (13,14). The ICmR recognises that women should 
have equal right to participate in research and should not be 
deprived arbitrarily of the opportunity to benefit from research; 
however, sometimes women’s autonomy is compromised 
because researchers have to abide by the requirements of local 
cultural practices in order not to disturb the harmony in the 
household or community (13: sec. 6.4, p 60). 
A key aspect of reproductive autonomy is reproductive rights, 
which include the right to make sexual and reproductive 
decisions, as recognised by the 1994 United nation 
International Conference on population and Development (15). 
These rights include contraceptive rights, the right to undergo 
legal and safe abortion, the right to make decisions pertaining 
to reproduction free of coercion, discrimination and violence. 
The Indian perspective on reproductive rights takes account of 
several inequalities and contradictions in society. In 2009, the 
supreme Court recognised women’s reproductive autonomy 
as a fundamental right, stating that “There is no doubt that a 
woman’s right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension 
of ‘personal liberty’ as understood under Article 21.” (16) 
needless to say, reproductive rights extend to surrogacy as well. 
surrogacy is a complex issue which raises multiple ethical and 
legal issues including definitions of parenthood and custody of 
children. surrogacy may be commercial or altruistic in nature. 
In India commercial surrogacy was legalised in 2002 and soon 
acquired an internal market as several foreign couples came 
to India to commission surrogacy at costs much lower than 
in their own countries. The debate on commercial surrogacy 
was sparked off in India by a controversial case in 2008 (17,18), 
where the Indian judiciary had to resolve legal issues relating 
to the “statelessness” of children born via surrogacy. Over time, 
numerous cases of abandonment of babies, exploitation of 
surrogates and egg donors, and non-payment of promised 
monetary compensation were reported (19).
It has been argued that surrogacy depersonalises reproduction 
(20: p 2). There is social stigma and ostracism attached to 
surrogacy in India’s social structure (21: p 975, 4: p 1). The socially 
conservative culture of India treats the surrogate mother as 
a disposable object. Despite this, commercial surrogacy in 
India has moved far beyond myth (3). The factors conducive 
to commercial surrogacy in India such as comparatively lower 
costs, availability of a large pool of women ready to become 
surrogates, and lack of regulation have consequently turned 
India, until recently, into the most sought-after destination for 
reproductive tourism and womb renting (4).
based on the recommendations of the Law Commission of 
India, the Union Cabinet approved the surrogacy (Regulation) 
bill in 2016 (22). The bill had been introduced to prevent 
commercialisation of surrogacy, prohibit potential exploitation 
of surrogate mothers and of children born through surrogacy. 
however, the bill questions the reproductive rights of women. 
The right to life enshrines the right to reproductive autonomy, 
inclusive of the right to procreation as an exclusive right, 
free of the state’s interference. The decision on the mode of 
parenthood should lie with an individual and not with the 
state. The bill hinges on the paternalistic imperative to protect 
the surrogate against exploitation, as seen in commercial 
surrogacy, and to permit surrogacy only involving a “near 
relative” and for altruistic reasons. It proposes to bring in 
the greatest utility for the greatest number of women, but 
surprisingly the bill has disregarded the ethical issue of 
whether “altruism” within patriarchal familial contexts can 
be free of coercion, given the social premium placed on 
motherhood. besides this, it recommended conditional 
surrogacy to married Indian couples, disqualifying others on 
the basis of nationality, marital status, sexual orientation or age 
– decisions which do not appear to pass the test of equality 
as described under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution 
(23), or of being a reasonable classification, satisfying the 
very objective it seeks to achieve. The bill severely limits the 
autonomy of potential surrogates with stringent conditions 
and requirements of eligibility certificates. 
The parliamentary standing Committee Report (2017) on 
the surrogacy (Regulation) bill reckoned that coercing a 
married couple to come out in the open about their infertility 
breaches privacy, especially given the stigma often attached 
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to infertility (3). The Report raises similar concerns regarding 
the surrogates whose identity would be disclosed and 
privacy compromised. The bill had also left unanswered the 
question of ensuring protection of health of the surrogate 
mother; it prohibited homosexual couples from opting for 
surrogacy services because the Indian state does not recognise 
homosexual persons as legal citizens. while the Delhi high 
Court ruled down Article 377 of the IpC in 2009, granting same-
sex relationships a legal status, the supreme Court of India set 
aside the high Court’s ruling in 2013 (24). by limiting surrogacy 
only to those physically incapable of maintaining a pregnancy, 
so-called “socially infertile” women are disqualified under the 
2016 bill. 
The use of reproductive technologies and surrogacy 
arrangements needs to be regulated. The law should promote 
transparency by incorporating the principle of accountability. 
Ethical practices should be encouraged. There is definitely a 
need for regulation. but the blanket restriction proposed in the 
2016 surrogacy bill is akin to capping a volcano. while there 
is a need for regulation, we cannot wish away the advances 
in medical science and the subsequent impact on surrogacy. 
we need to have a legislation which, while dealing with the 
problems associated with surrogacy does not interfere with 
the reproductive rights and freedom of choice of women. The 
use of biomedical technologies enables a simultaneous focus 
on women’s bodies as sources of both reproductive power and 
value, and away from their bodies exclusively as vessels for the 
“vansh” or progeny for their families. Future research ought 
to highlight the inequalities and ethical complexities both in 
national and transnational reproductive transfers.  
Abortion and reproductive autonomy 
The attitude of the Indian judiciary to the right to reproductive 
choice is garnered from decisions that handled issues 
concerning abortion in controversial situations. The question 
that has been posed before Indian courts most often is 
whether abortion without spousal consent amounts to 
cruelty, which is recognised as a reason for divorce in 
India (25: p. 85). The Indian judiciary’s attitude expressed a 
complete disregard of the woman’s right to privacy, and her 
right to make independent reproductive choices (26). but 
on 24 August, 2017, there was a historic judgment (27) which 
specifically recognised the constitutional right of women to 
make reproductive choices as a part of personal liberty under 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The bench recognised 
privacy as an inalienable right, based on values such as dignity 
that underlies all our fundamental rights, and it categorically 
located privacy in the individual. while the judges phrased 
their conceptions of privacy differently, the bench held in 
common that privacy encompasses personal autonomy 
concerning body and mind and making choices, as well as 
informational privacy. The draft of the national policy for 
women (2016) aims to protect the rights of women adopting 
reproductive technologies (28). 
In the puttaswamy judgment (27), the bench reiterated the 
position adopted by the three-judge bench in the suchita 
srivastava case (16) which upheld that reproductive rights 
include the woman’s right to privacy, dignity and bodily 
integrity. The suchita srivastava case arose in the context of 
the medical Termination of pregnancy Act (1971) (mTp Act) 
(29); this Act governs abortions in India. The mTp Act permits 
abortion where the continuance of the pregnancy will cause 
“grave injury to mental or physical health.” The Act recognises 
the anguish caused by the “grave injury to mental health” in 
pregnancy as a consequence of the failure of contraception. 
strangely enough, the anguish caused by a pregnancy applies 
only to married women and does not recognise the anguish 
caused to an unmarried woman by an unwanted pregnancy. 
It reveals that “the Act was motivated not by libertarian ideals 
but by the need to promote abortion as a family planning tool” 
(26: p. 77). 
Further, the mTp Act does not leave the decision to abort with 
the woman. section 3 of the Act states that only registered 
medical practitioners can terminate a woman’s pregnancy 
provided that the doctor believes in good faith that continuing 
the pregnancy would be a risk to the woman’s life or that 
the child would be born with serious physical or mental 
abnormalities. If the woman has been pregnant for 12 weeks, 
the permission of one medical practitioner is required, and 
if the pregnancy extends between 12 and 20 weeks, the 
permission of two medical practitioners is mandatory. The 
Act was not envisaged as a tool for women to control their 
reproductive choices. The Act grants veto power to a third 
person, viz the medical practitioner. Thus, abortion laws in 
India reflect that policy makers consider abortion a tool for 
controlling population growth, rather than an expression 
of women’s right to control their bodies. It has met with 
opposition over the years for its restrictive nature and for 
not being able to accommodate the growing technological 
advancements in medicine1.
The privacy judgment significantly bolsters calls for reform, 
paving ways for sections 3 and 5 of the mTp Act to be 
contested. section 5 of the Act is applicable in the case of 
termination of pregnancy beyond 20 weeks, where the doctors 
believe that abortion is an immediate requirement in order to 
save the woman’s life. In 2017, the sC clarified that abortion 
at 24 weeks is legal in the case of anencephaly, which is a 
fatal foetal impairment that also puts the mother’s life at risk, 
stating that her rights to bodily integrity and reproductive 
autonomy allow her to “preserve her own life against the 
avoidable danger to it” (30). The law recognises only medical 
reasons and risks to allow abortion, delegitimising all other 
reasons for a woman to seek abortion. A woman is coerced to 
carry a pregnancy to full term unless it poses a grave risk to her 
life, even if other grounds of physical and mental anomalies 
in the foetus are satisfied as per section 3. so, sections 3 and 
5 evidently infringe women’s rights to make reproductive 
choices which the bench affirmed as part of the right to 
privacy. The law hardly leaves room for non-medical concerns 
over the economic burden of child-rearing, effects on career, or 
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other personal reasons. In fact, the Act turns a blind eye to the 
plight of married women who are forced to conceive and carry 
the pregnancy to term against their will. This is grounded in 
the reason that the marital rape of women older than 15 years 
does not legally amount to rape2.
It is to be noted that fundamental rights are placed under 
limitations by the state, but these limitations need to pass 
tests outlined in constitutional jurisprudence. The bench 
affirmed that any curb on privacy will be tested according to 
the fundamental rights which it infringes and the established 
jurisprudence on those rights. The bench distinctly focused on 
Article 21, which guarantees the fundamental right to life and 
personal liberty, and entails a “just, reasonable, and fair” test 
(31), that is, any law curbing Article 21 must be “just, reasonable, 
and fair” to remain constitutionally valid. 
The mTp (Amendment) bill 2014 (32) seeks to broaden the 
reproductive rights under the Act. most importantly for 
privacy concerns, the bill allows abortion on the “request” 
of a woman up to 12 weeks of pregnancy without having 
to justify the woman’s needs. The Abortion Assessments 
project also revealed that doctors in public sector hospitals 
sometimes refuse to perform abortions unless women 
undergo sterilisation concurrently (33). Through section 2(d), 
the bill aims to improve access to abortion by giving access 
to “registered healthcare providers.” section 5A of the bill 
mandates that no registered healthcare provider shall disclose 
the name and other details of the woman about to undergo 
abortion. however, the amended bill may not satisfactorily 
address all privacy concerns with the Act’s restrictions on 
abortions. 
It is to be noted that though the newly amended mTp bill 
(32) permits abortion beyond 12 weeks at the request of 
the woman, yet women still have to prove that it was an 
unplanned pregnancy or that contraceptive measures have 
failed, which still considerably restricts their power to exercise 
their reproductive choice in this issue. The state does not 
merely have a negative duty not to infringe privacy, but also 
has the positive obligation to uphold reproductive autonomy 
and take steps to sustain an individual’s privacy as held in the 
puttaswamy judgment (27). Apart from the privacy judgment, 
in the 2016 case of High Court on its Own Motion v State of 
Maharashtra (34), the bombay high Court ruled in favour of 
improving the access of women prisoners to abortion and 
strongly affirmed women’s rights to abortion as a part of the 
fundamental right conforming to the right to live with dignity 
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The judgment 
recognises that unwanted pregnancies are disproportionately 
cumbersome to the woman and to force her to carry a 
pregnancy to term represents a violation of the woman’s 
bodily integrity and aggravates her mental trauma thus 
being harmful to her mental health condition. Even when the 
judiciary does give access to abortion beyond 20 weeks, the 
fact that women have to move the court highlights a further 
restriction on their access to safe and legal abortions, thus 
hindering their reproductive autonomy. In a country where 
9 to 20% of maternal deaths occur due to unsafe abortions 
(35) there is an urgent requirement to align the provisions of 
the mTp Act with these judgments. From the above decisions, 
it appears as if the supreme Court supports reproductive 
autonomy, but when it comes to abortion, women are not 
given any real control, though the most recent supreme Court 
and bombay high Court decisions (27, 34) may be an indication 
of progress.
The court applies the protection of privacy to those 
rights it deems implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, 
fundamentally affecting a person, or so significant that they 
need to continue to be inviolable. In fact, the right to privacy 
has spawned discussions on the right to integrity of one’s 
personality, and the right to “selfhood” (36: p. 330).  A woman’s 
security in her own body is fundamental to her intellectual, 
psychological development. but this security of women again 
gets compromised with the implementation of reproductive 
technologies, especially in surrogacy. The privacy judgment 
did not explicitly refer to surrogacy, but it affirmed existing 
jurisprudence on privacy, which has considered personal 
decisions about birth and babies as being part of reproductive 
autonomy (37).
Conclusion: issues that need to be resolved 
A brief examination of the legislative viewpoint in the country, 
with regard to the right of reproductive autonomy of women, 
reveals its notion of deep-rooted patriarchy. social change is the 
most difficult but also the most crucial element of overcoming 
the influence of biologism and pronatalism on patients’ 
reproductive autonomy. The framework for our collective 
convictions and ideologies needs to be more accommodating 
and sensitive towards the condition of women. These social 
changes may help to challenge the assumptions that all women 
want children, that biological connections are better than social 
connections and moreover, that those who fail to meet the pro-
natalist or biologistic stereotypes are deficient in some ways. 
Undoubtedly, personal, medical and social contexts in which 
these technologies are delivered would have a far-reaching 
effect on the extent to which these reproductive options may 
challenge or support the autonomy of both individual women 
and women as a group. 
Reproductive autonomy is a basic right. women see this as 
necessary because pregnancy and child rearing are for all 
practical purposes, the sole responsibility of women. women 
should therefore have the right to choose when and under 
what circumstances they will bring a child into the world, 
for women should be able to control what happens to their 
bodies and lives. The right to safe and legal abortion is also 
an essential right of self-determination. The privacy judgment 
has rekindled the debate around abortion. The judgment 
enabled the restoring of the reproductive autonomy of women 
and providing impetus to the better amendment of the long 
pending mTp (Amendment) bill. This will help in reducing 
the social pressure and stigma attached to procurement of 
abortion. It needs to be understood that not every woman 
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wants to abort the foetus. however, the choice must be free 
of coercion so that she may decide her future course of action 
concerning her pregnancy.
The autonomy of the individual is conditioned by the 
individual’s relationship with the rest of society. Those 
relationships may and do often pose questions to autonomy 
and free choice. The overarching presence of state and non-
state actors regulates aspects of social existence which bear 
upon the freedom of the individual. In India women continue 
to experience significant obstacles in their full enjoyment of 
reproductive rights including denial of women’s decision-
making authority. For long, reproductive health-based laws 
and policies in India have failed to take a women’s rights-
based approach; instead they have focused on demographic 
targets, such as population control, while also implicitly or 
explicitly undermining women’s reproductive autonomy 
through discriminatory provisions such as spousal consent 
requirements for access to reproductive health services. The 
issue of spousal consent involves a balancing of the woman’s 
right to privacy and personal autonomy and the spouse’s 
interests in the life of the unborn child.
Finally, the goal of reproductive research is not only to respect 
the autonomy of women, but also to expand reproductive 
freedom. To this end, there must be more equal participation 
in medical research by women and members of minority 
groups. modern technology and gender relations are deeply 
intertwined; therefore, a feminist critique of philosophies 
of technology in the context of a feminist understanding of 
infertility brought women together to evaluate this matter. I 
believe that as rational beings and informed and competent 
decision-makers, women are strongly placed to decide what 
is beneficial for them. we should leave women to decide 
whether the reproductive technologies enrich and enlarge our 
lives as women or whether in accepting and abetting these 
technologies we are forcing ourselves in serving to accept a 
misogynist ideal of freedom. If there be any coercive element 
behind these reproductive interventions, then we should try 
and eliminate the coercive element, not the technologies. 
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Notes
1 One specific advance that requires mention here relates to the detection 
of cardiac anomalies only after 22 weeks of pregnancy. The national 
Commission for women (nCw) recommended that the Union health 
ministry extend the time limit from 20 to 24 weeks, acknowledging the 
present developments in medical diagnostic technologies, in addition 
to the social scenario. The mTp Amendment bill of 2014 also changed 
the time limit from 20 to 24 weeks in keeping with the recommendation 
of the nCw.
2 In light of the privacy judgment, a two-judge sC bench recently read 
down the exception for marital rape and held that forced sex with all 
minor wives and not just wives under 15 years, would constitute rape. 
The larger exception for marital rape is expected to be debated further.
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Abstract 
The routinisation of assisted reproduction in India has led to its 
proliferation and the easy identification of infertility. However, 
clinical and popular discourse tends to focus primarily on 
age-related deficiencies in reproduction. Here, both the “dangers” 
of declining reproduction as well as the facilitation of delayed 
reproduction are areas of focus and eulogisation. Bringing 
together the diverse elements of the medico-social conversation, 
the aim of this commentary is to examine the ways in which the 
ARTs are used to make sense of declining reproduction.
Background
In its representation in academic literature and in life, ageing is 
seen as a state of decline and debilitation. Its physical markers 
are associated with regression and a slowing down of the 
“normal” body. In the process, more often than not, ageing 
has conceptually also been compared to a pathological, 
diseased state of being. This is especially so in relation to 
women’s bodies, where the idea of ageing within biomedicine 
is associated with progressive reproductive decline (1,2). 
This conceptualisation of ageing and its association with 
reproduction is the most provocative in contemporary medical 
practice and ideology.
In this commentary, I discuss how ageing and aged bodies 
become signifiers of failed and resurrected reproduction. This 
is particularly evident in the case of assisted reproduction 
through the use of technologies such as in-vitro fertilisation 
(IvF) and/or intracystoplasmic sperm injection (ICsI), besides 
other assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) that are 
becoming popular in the “curing of infertility” as an emerging 
health problem. The paradoxical position that ARTs occupy 
within the socio-medical discourse on infertility is seen in 
the ways in which the failure of the technology to “cure” is 
often projected on to issues of age (3), just as the technology 
promises to alleviate the obstacles of age in seeking infertility 
treatment. however, the recent public fear of the ticking 
“biological clock”, especially with regard to working women 
in their 30s with no children - and the associated fanfare 
surrounding the birth of children to 70-year-old women 
through IvF (4) - has led to questions regarding how infertility 
and ARTs are marking ageing and reproduction in India. 
